



National Committee for Cyber Security, Resilience and Business Continuity for Electrical Grids

President: Prof. Paola Girdinio – Università degli Studi di Genova - DITEN –Dipartimento di Ingegneria Navale, Elettrica, Elettronica e delle Telecomunicazioni
(Department of Naval, Electronic, Electric and TeleCommunications Engineering)

Security Officer: Dr. Antonio Rebora - Ansaldo Energia SpA


Business Continuity & Crisis Management: Gianna Detoni – PANTA RAY

St. Petersburg – September 28 2017

The growing integration between the IT and OT world is of outstanding importance in relation to the management of smart grids. On the other hand, it has introduced cyber risks within the whole electrical field/sector.


The IT-OT integration versus Cyber Risk

Smart Grid's main Components




For a correct management, a strong interconnection between different elements is needed

Evolution of Industrial Control Systems (e.g. DCS)



Due to this development, managers are asked to raise awareness on how cyber threats can affect the business and the service supply

Electricity Sector Worldwide Cyber Security Threat Landscape


Threat Actor Examples: Dragonfly / Energetic Bear		Action Period	✦ 2011 - 2017	Targets	✦ Energy grid, production company and Industrial Solutions suppliers including ICS ✦ 84 nation affected, particularly US, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey e Poland
		Description	An hacking group from Eastern Europe focusing mainly on sabotage and espionage		

Examples: Significant Cyber Security Accidents	Shamoon Attack - Saudi Aramco		BlackEnergy Power Grid in Ucraina		Ransomware Attack - Utility ¹ , Michigan USA		DDOS Attack - DYN Domain Name System	
	Attacker	Cutting Sword of Justice	Attacker	Unknown	Attacker	Unknown	Attacker	Unknown
	Discovery date	August 2012	Discovery date	December 2015	Discovery date	April 2016	Data Scoperta	October 2016
	Target	Political sabotage	Target	Political sabotage	Target	Financial (Ransom)	Target	Vandalism
	Impact	✦ 35,000 hard drives partially / totally destroyed ✦ IT services offline ✦ 5 months for a full recovery	Impact	✦ Completely acquisition of the remote control of HMI, SCADA, power backup and telco systems ✦ 230,00 resident citizens offline for hours (best case) or days (worst case)	Impact	✦ Spear phishing attack with malware inoculation ✦ Self-forced stop of all company systems for two weeks	Impact	✦ DDOS attack from about "ten million" of malware infected IoT ✦ Amazon, PayPal, Twitter, Netflix, Spotify and other off-line for several hours

1) Lansing Board of Water and Light, Lansing, Michigan USA


In the mid-1990's , North America started to develop field regulations for the Cyber Security management, which eventually turned out into structural frameworks.

Cyber Security in Nord America




Since 2004, Europe has been provided with increasingly developed organisms, strategies, and regulations in order to increase and improve the management of Cyber Security topics.

Cyber Security in Europe




Since 2014 Italy has been experiencing a strong speed-up as far as Cyber Security is concerned, while in the next few months further steps ahead are likely to occur.


Cyber Security in Italy



The Italian National Strategic Framework, amongst others, encourages the partnership between public and private sector



National Strategic Framework





National Strategic Framework



1. Improvement of intelligence agencies, and civil and military defense capabilities
- 2. Improvement of the organization and the methodologies of coordination and interaction between public and private entities**
3. Promotion and spread of a culture of information security. Teaching and training
4. International cooperation and exercises
5. Operations of national CERT, CERT-PA and local CERTs
6. Legislative action and compliance with international standards
7. Compliance with standards and safety protocols
8. Support to the industrial and technological development
9. Strategic communication
10. Resources
11. Implementation of a national Information Risk Management system

The norms, and particularly the partnership private-public sector and the involvement of the academic world, inspired the creation of the Committee

National Committee for Cyber Security of Electrical Grids

VISION

The National Committee for Cyber Security, Resilience and Business Continuity of Electrical Grids has the objective to develop an instrument which allows for 1) an integrated management of cyber security, 2) the creation and promotion of collaboration initiatives, 3) information exchange and research in the field of electric energy grids, **through the involvement of both public and private entities.**

STRUCTURE

The permanent working table formed in 2015 performs its activities regarding all the national Critical Electric Infrastructures and all the levels of the national system of Generation, Transmission and Distribution (AT/MT/BT), with particular attention to new assets of Cyber Security of the modern National grid, which presents more and more Green and Smart Grid elements.

The working table of the Committee has numerous collaborations and contributions, starting from the Scuola Politecnica of Engineering of the University of Genova, to the biggest national players of electric energy, such as ENEL, ANSALDO Energia, TERNA, IREN and others. In addition to them, there are also providers of systems and products which support the grids, such as Leonardo, Kaspersky, Siemens, ABB, and others.

Contacts with companies and entities that operate on the national territory; PANTA RAY, Intellium-Deloitte, MAPS Group, GCSEC.

The Committee has the objective to facilitate the development of a framework that will assist the Italian Operators in the electricity field in managing effectively the Cyber Security challenges

Main challenges for the Electrical Companies

LEADERSHIP

- Involvement of the Top Management
- Cooperation among the Operators (CERT-based)
- Methodologies applied to measure the Cyber Risk

The evolution of the **regulatory framework** and the lack of **national standard for the industry** cause uncertainty.


NORMS and REGULATIONS

- Strategic Goal
- Standard
- Compliance requirements

Many programs of cyber security are focused on technological elements, thus causing a **disconnection of the leadership** and the business requirements.

TECHNOLOGY

- Networks and ICT Applications
- DCS, SCADA, PLC
- VPP
- Smart Meter and Connected Products



The first step is the identification of the methodologies that will enable the involvement of the Top Management, facilitating a common language among people with a different background...

Key Cyber Security Actors

Key Cyber Security Actors	Top Management	Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)	Information and Communications Technology (ICT)	Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
Typical Background	MBA	Audit / Security	Electronics / Communications	Industrial Process Engineering
Daily Terminology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profit and Loss • Balance Sheet • Stakeholder Relations • Marketing Strategy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business Impact Analysis • COSO Model • SOX Compliance • Supply and Demand Risks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAM • TCP / IP • OSI Model • ISO 27001/2 (ISMS) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regasification • Purdue Model • HAZOPs • ISA / IEC 62443
Typical Vendors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • McKinsey & Co • Bain & Co • Boston Consulting Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Big 4 Auditors • EMC / RSA / Archer • SAS Analytics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Microsoft • IBM / HP • SAP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ABB • Honeywell • Emerson
Primary Concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overall Business Success 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Optimized Risk Portfolio 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel Safety • Process Efficiency / Availability

...and define a common methodology to introduce to the board members all the cyber risks identified in the IT and OT

Example of a methodology for the Cyber Risk Management

Cyber Security Risk Management ICT e ICS

Level of risk evaluation for the three parameters: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), Availability (A).

Coordinamento tra le funzioni

Impact analysis, both for IT and OT, facilitating the cooperation among the organization's functions, aiming to identify the systems' relationship and interconnections.

Metodologia comune


Alignment with the ERM methodology to enable a comparison among the levels of Cyber risk with the other risks managed in the Enterprise

Metodo di selezione rischi ICT / ICS

Definition of tools to present to the Risk Officer a clear overview of the risks connected to the IT and OT world.


Presentazione al Board

Presentation to the CCR of the main risks only. The elements managed at the Enterprise level are filtered considering only those that are within the predefined 'Risk Appetite'.



Defining Principles, Guidelines and Best Practices for the management of cyber security and in compliance with European and national norms

Guidelines



Guidelines

Part 1 – Recommendations for the management of Cyber Security

- What is Cyber Security and the normative framework
- Approach to Cyber Security in the Electricity field
- Role of Top Management in Cyber Risk Management
- Business continuity and risk management
- Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT)
- Development of a Cyber Security Programme Governance
- Required resources
- Training
- Management of Service Providers

Part 2 – Notes for implementation

- Implementation of measures in the context of critical infrastructures in the field of electricity
- Notes for the implementation of NIST CORE Framework

In order to support the operators of the electricity field in the management of cyber security topics, the Committee defined an action plan based on 5 key points

Action Plan of the Committee

01

...defining a National Framework for Cyber Security

02

...helping Top Management to handle cyber risk

03

...developing a capability of Incident Response

04

...promoting Information-Sharing

05

...improving Business Continuity and Cyber Readiness...

...through the collaboration and cooperation of Public Entities, Academies, Technology Producers and Experts of Cyber Security



National Committee for Cyber Security, Resilience and Business Continuity for Electrical Grids

President: Prof. Paola Girdinio – Università degli Studi di Genova - DITEN –Dipartimento di Ingegneria Navale, Elettrica, Elettronica e delle Telecomunicazioni
(Department of Naval, Electronic, Electric and TeleCommunications Engineering)

Security Officer: Dr. Antonio Rebora - Ansaldo Energia SpA

Business Continuity & Crisis Management: Gianna Detoni – PANTA RAY

St. Petersburg – September 28 2017