



Kaspersky Industrial
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How to find and hack various GSM- devices: from children's watches to industrial controllers

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
About me

Independent researcher

GSM-devices fanboy

Telecom fanboy

I will mix it today



Plan for this talk

Types of devices

Hacking methods

Several examples

Reasons to hack

Easy to hack, hard to find

Types of devices



GSM-alarms

- Uses detectors
- Makes the call when someone open door or window
- Uses small microphone
- Can be configured remotely



GSM-electric sockets

- Uses SMS or calls to switch on/off
- Can be configured remotely



GSM-smarthomes controllers

- Can control different devices
- Uses SMS, calls or apps to be managed
- Can be configured remotely

Types of devices



Industrial controllers

- Are close to a home controller, but have more features
- Different control methods



Access control systems

- Uses SMS or calls to open or close door or gate
- Can be configured remotely



GSM-trackers

- Collects information about location, etc
- Some models can be configured remotely



Smartwatches for kids


- Like mobile phone, but with addition control
- Can use microphone
- Can be configured remotely

Reasons to hack


- Direct attack (silently open door)
- Using microphones to overhear someone
- Destroy property (explosions)
- Terrorism
- Political events
- Financial attacks
- Botnets for spam
- Reverse attack on accounts
- Penetration in a system
- Some funny ideas

Big problem:

Thousands of devices have dozens
of points of failure



... or there...



Attack on environment

- Break the wall
- Break the window or door without opening
- Smash main unit fastly
- Bypass detectors (magnets, Faraday cage)
- Jamming




Attack on connection

- Jamming connection modem - base station
- Attacks on mobile networks
- Spend all money in account or change tariff
- Block SIM-card
- Flood with calls



Attacks on device

- Caller ID check
- SMS sender check
- Bruteforce
- Default passwords, stolen passwords
- Lack of authorization
- Online configurators
- Hidden commands and passwords



Attack on other systems

- Insecure security agency
- Old protocols
- Attacks on family/employees
- Phishing
- Spoofed reverse call from device
- Reverse-attacks on mobile operator



Home devices

- Thousands (or millions) of devices
- Easy to research
- Easy to hack
- A bit hard to find
- Can be used to steal private information

Industrial devices

- Are not so widespread, as home devices
- Not so easy, not so hard to hack
- Harder to hack
- Hard to find
- Can be more profitable

Targets

Individual person


- Target is an individual person
- Several facts are available usually
- Devices are common
- Several people can manage device

Individual company

- Target is a company or a part of company
- Can be very hard to find devices phones and control phones
- May use uncommon and expensive devices

Unspecified (massive attack)

- Find as many as possible
- Hack all devices
- Expenses/profit balance
- Automatization and “big data”




I can
hack alarm

Tell me
number

Hack
my

No



Big problem for hackers:

It is *easy** to hack devices, but how to find targets?

IP-addresses

- We can have 4 294 967 296 IPv4 addresses at all
- We can scan fast
- We can do it cheap
- We have actual databases

VS

Phone numbers

- We can have more than 999 999 999 numbers only in Russia
- No public database
- Scanning is expensive
- Scanning is slow

Mass “Scanning”

- 1) Making a calls to all phone numbers (yes, it sounds terrible)
- 2) Record answers
- 3) Try to get some information form answers
- 4) ...
- 5) Hack and get profit (or go broke)

Results:

- More, than million of roubles spent
- Collected information about thousands of active* devices
- Maybe, some organisations will try to understand, what happening
- Money burned in small regions



Idea:

Using different methods to get information about phone numbers of devices and reduce time for an attack

Groups of phone numbers

Confirmed

- Used for required type of device
- Ready to be hacked, yeah

Unconfirmed

- Can be used for device
- Can be used for anything
- ...

Removed

- Used in mobile phones
- Used in IVR systems
- Abandoned
- Are not sold

Numbers recycling problem

- Mobile operators deactivate numbers abandoned for 2-3-6 months
- We can't blindly believe to old information, owner can be changed

Select new number service

- Get information about definitely unused numbers
- Remove previous information

Выберите номер, и мы подберем для вас похожий

Например, вы выбрали номер +7 XXX 145-66-67.

У нас есть похожие номера +7 XXX 145-66-68, +7 XXX 145-67-67, +7 XXX 145-66-67

+7 - - - [Подобрать](#)

Бесплатно

Специальные предложения

+7 965 7 99 4354

+7 965 7 99 8066

+7 964 3 99 2562

+7 964 3 99 5122

+7 964 3 99 6018

+7 969 7 99 4098

[Показать больше](#)

Выберите номер телефона

Получить новый

Перенести свой

0 ₺

1 000 ₺

3 000 ₺

15 000 ₺

977 135-25-32

977 137-71-76

977 137-15-76

977 135-61-94

977 136-17-73

977 137-78-03

Mobile operators API answers

- Mobile operators systems can have special API, which can be used to check, if this number is in use or no
- Errors, different answers
- Unused numbers can be removed from list

Companies databases and anti-spam databases

- Several apps (like 2GIS on right) allows to get information about phone numbers
- Attackers can download this databases and remove companies phone numbers from list
- Also, an anti-spam database can contain information about numbers, that can be released soon



Spam databases

- Spam databases contain information about thousands active phone numbers
- Attackers can buy/steal/get this databases and remove all active numbers from list

Leaked databases

- Sometimes it is possible to get database with information about millions users
- Attackers can try to select active numbers and remove these numbers from list

Unauthorized access to mobile operators databases

By information from several public sources, it is possible to pay a small bribe and get access to info from mobile operators database:


- It is possible to get info about subscribers phone numbers
- Information about regular calls can be used to find device and phone numbers of family



GetContact and similar apps

- Several applications can show phone number with related name from list
- Attackers can try to select active numbers and remove these numbers from their database
- Also, it can be interesting to find phones with names like “Alarm”, “Home”, “Car”, “Datcha”, etc





Useful app to control
devices

Phone numbers and
passwords

Direct search

Usually, we know something: address, names, phone numbers

- Bribes are still useful (it is not a suggestion)
- Antennas
- Fake base stations
- Social engineering
- Phishing
- Insecure security agency



Security companies

- Promotion is important
- Vendors can show information about clients
- Security agencies can show examples of projects
- Some companies show full list of clients





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Conclusion

- It is not so hard to find devices
- Several models are totally insecure
- Industrial devices are not widespread, but you can find some
- The security level of mobile operators is questionable

Thank you,
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