



Kaspersky Industrial
Cybersecurity
Conference 2019

September 18-20, 2019, Sochi, Russia

Validating defense mechanisms of cyber-physical systems via attack tools

Francisco Furtado

Salimah Liyakkathali

Agenda

iTrust

Cyber physical attacks & defense

A6 Tool

Demo

Findings & Conclusion

WHO WE ARE

FUNDING

NATIONAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
SINGAPORE

SWITD
SINGAPORE UNIVERSITY OF
TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN

iTrust
Centre for Research
in Cyber Security

COLLABORATORS



MISSOURI
S&T

Imperial College
London



WHO WE ARE

FOCUS AREAS

CPS
Enterprise Security
IoT

iTrust
Centre for Research
in Cyber Security

DISTINCTIVE VALUES

Applied Research
Testbeds
Multi-disciplinary
Students
Industry Collaboration

TESTBEDS

(IoT) Automatic Security



Secure Water Treatment (SWaT)




Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC)



Water Distribution (WADI)



iTrust Event



Critical Infrastructure Security Showdown
2019



Cyber physical attacks

Maroochy shire sewage

Blaster worm

13 US auto plants

Offshore oil platform

Petro chemical plant


Discovery of Stuxnet

Ukraine power grids

TRITON attack



Attacks in ICS



Goh, Jonathan, et al. "A dataset to support research in the design of secure water treatment systems." *International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security*. Springer, Cham, 2016.

Cyber physical defence mechanism

Anomaly Detection Mechanisms (ADM)

Design-based

Machine learning-based



Distributed Attack Detection (DAD)

- Design based ADM
- Uses invariants obtained from plant design
- Invariants cannot be compromised
- Attacks: 56 , Detected: 45

Experiments	Attack Type	Attacks	Detected
Exp-A	SS	10	10
	SM	5	5
	DS	3	5
	DM	2	2
	Total		20
Exp-I	SS	11	9
	SM	1	1
	SS: Physical	1	1
	DoS (HMI)	3	0
	DoS (SCADA)	1	0
	DoS (PLC-HMI)	1	0
	Total		18
Exp-S	S1 (SS)	4	0
	S2 (SS)	13	13
	Total	17	13
Exp-DoS	DoS (PLC)	1	1
	Total	1	1


Sridhar Adepu, and Aditya Mathur. "Distributed detection of single-stage multipoint cyber attacks in a water treatment plant." *Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security*. ACM, 2016.

Sridhar Adepu, and Aditya Mathur. "Distributed Attack Detection in a Water Treatment Plant: Method and Case Study". *IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing*, 2018


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Why is there a need for an
attack tool ?


SWaT Network Architecture




Level 3 – Operation Management




Level 2 – Supervisory Control



Level 1 – Plant control network



Level 0 - Process




System Overview

Date / Time

Current User

Overview	Raw Water	Pre-Treatment	Ultra-Filtration	De-Chlorination	Reverse Osmosis	RO Product
System Architecture	Trends	Alarms & Events	Summary			Legend



Waiting for Alarm Events...




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


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


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


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


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


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


Waiting for Alarm Events...




A6 Tool suite tool

A6-L1




A6 Tool suite tool

A6-L0




Attack Design

A6 - L1



A6 - L0



Mutation Operators

Operator	Description	Example
Add Static Delta (ASD)	Adds/subtracts an absolute, unchanging δ to state measurements	ASD(500) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=800
Add Limits Delta (ALD)	Adds/subtracts random value between $-\delta$ and $+\delta$ to state measurements	ALD(10) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=307
Add Random Delta (ARD)	Adds/subtracts a random value between δ_1 and δ_2 to state measurements	ARD(100, 200) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=450 ARD(100, 200) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=450

Mutation Operators

Operator	Description	Example
Set to Zero	Set state measurement to zero	Before: MV101=1 After: MV101=0
Set to One	Set state measurement to one	Before: P101=0 After: P101=1
Set to Static	Set state measurement to static value	STS(756) ⇒ Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=756
Set to Random	Set state measurement to a random value between $\delta 1$ and $\delta 2$	STR(100, 200) ⇒ Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=179

Mutation Operators

Operator	Description	Example
Bit Shift Left	State measurement is bit-shifted to left by δ bits	BSL(4) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=5982.85
Bit Shift Right	State measurement is bit-shifted to right by δ bits	BSR(4) \Rightarrow Before: LIT101=300 After: LIT101=3356044.00

Command Validators


Operator	Description	Example
Valid	Set state measurement to valid input	Before: P101 = 1 (On) After: P101 = 0 (Off)
Invalid	Set state measurement to invalid input	Before: P101 = 0 (Off) After: P101 = -5 (Invalid)


L1 Attack Demo

Stage 1 strategy is to have P101 and P102 be interlocked with LIT301


- Low Setpoint: 800mm \Rightarrow P101/P102 START
- High Setpoint: 1000mm \Rightarrow P101/P102 STOP

SSPMS Attack: Mutating of LIT301 value to LOW from PLC3 to PLC1







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
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Overview
Raw Water
Pre-Treatment
Ultra-Filtration

System Architecture
Trends
Alarms & Events
Summary



Plant Control Ready

Start Stop Auto Manual Reset



RSLogix 5000 - P3 [1756-L71 20.55] - [Controller Tags - P3(controller)]

Path: AB_ETHIP-1192.168.1.30\backplane0*

Value in PLC3

Name	Value
HMI_LIT301	820.7431
HMI_LIT301.Pv	0.0
HMI_LIT301.Heu	0.0
HMI_LIT301.Leu	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAHH	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAH	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAL	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SALL	250.0
HMI_LIT301.AHH	0
HMI_LIT301.AH	0
HMI_LIT301.AL	0
HMI_LIT301.ALL	0
HMI_LIT301.Wrfl_Erb	0
HMI_LIT301.Hty	1
HMI_LIT301.Sim	0
HMI_LIT301.Sim_PV	820.7431
LIT301_FB	...

RSLogix 5000 - P1 [1756-L71 20.55] - [Controller Tags - P1(controller)]

Path: AB_ETHIP-1192.168.1.10\backplane0*

Value in PLC1

Name	Value
HMI_LIT301	820.78314
HMI_LIT301.Pv	0.0
HMI_LIT301.Heu	0.0
HMI_LIT301.Leu	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAHH	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAH	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SAL	0.0
HMI_LIT301.SALL	250.0
HMI_LIT301.AHH	0
HMI_LIT301.AH	0
HMI_LIT301.AL	0
HMI_LIT301.ALL	0


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L0 Attack Demo

Stage 1 strategy is to have MV101 be activated by LIT101


- a) Low Low Setpoint: 250mm & P101/P102 STOP AND MV101 OPEN
- b) Low Setpoint: 500mm MV101 OPEN
- c) High Setpoint: 800mm MV101 CLOSE
- d) High High Setpoint: 1200mm Alarm

SSSMP Attack: Mutating P101 & MV101 status to PLC1 and command to actuators







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Overview

Raw Water

Pre-treatment

Ultra-Filtration

System Architecture

Trends

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Summary

Raw Water Level Meter LIT-101

768 mm


Plant Control

Ready

Start Stop Auto Manual Reset

UF Feed Level Meter LIT-301

828 mm



Waiting for Alarm Events...

RSLogix 5000 - P1 in Salimah_FTS_P1.ACD [1756-L71 20:55]

File Edit View Search Logic Communications Tools Window Help

Path: [AB_ETHIP-1\152.168.1.10\Backplane\0*]

Run Run Run Mode Controller OK Energy Storage OK I/O Not Responding

Controller Tags - P1(controller)

Name	Value	Force Mask	Style	Data Ty
+ HMI_MV201	[...]	[...]		MV_UD
- HMI_MV101	[...]	[...]		MV_UD
+ HMI_MV101.Cmd		1	Decimal	INT
+ HMI_MV101.Status		1	Decimal	INT
- HMI_MV101.Reset		1	Decimal	BOOL
- HMI_MV101.Auto		1	Decimal	BOOL
- HMI_MV101.FTO		0	Decimal	BOOL
- HMI_MV101.FTC		0	Decimal	BOOL
- HMI_MV101.Avi		1	Decimal	BOOL
+ MV101_FB	[...]	[...]		MV_FBI
+ P2_MV201_MSG	[...]	[...]		MESSA
+ MV201_AutoInp		0	Decimal	INT
+ MV101_STATE		6	Decimal	DINT
DD_MV_101_OPEN		0	Decimal	BOOL
DD_MV_101_CLOSE		1	Decimal	BOOL
DL_MV_101_ZS0		0	Decimal	BOOL
DL_MV_101_ZSC		1	Decimal	BOOL

5:33 PM
5/9/2019

Findings

1. Out of range values and commands
2. Corelated Invariants across PLCs
3. False positives

Current Work

1. Automated generation of attacks
2. Creating a test suite for ADMs to be tested against and given a benchmark

Specials thanks to

Sridhar Adepu

Gayathri Sugumar

Nils Ole Tippenhauer

Aditya P. Mathur

Questions?

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Thank you!

