



Kaspersky Industrial
Cybersecurity
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kaspersky

The fall of CODESYS

Researching security of the framework for PLC control

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


Question

What is the difference between a software library and a framework?

Question

What is the difference between a software library and a framework?



Question

What is inside CODESYS Runtime?



Agenda

CODESYS Runtime

Investigation protocol
stack

Vulnerabilities

Conclusion

CODESYS Runtime

What is it?

CODESYS Runtime

What is it?



MCA430



emPC-X



750-8212 PFC200

> 350



CODESYS Runtime has already been adapted

CODESYS Development System

A customizable development environment. Solution based on it include IDE:

- SoMachine by Schneider Electric
- TwinCAT by Beckhoff Automation
- IdraWorks by Bosch
- Wagilo Pro by WAGO
- CODESYS Development System by OWEN, STW Technic and prolog-plc
- And others

CODESYS Runtime Architecture



CODESYS Runtime Components

First and main component – Component Manager

Components are dynamic libraries (like .dll, .so). Interfaces:

component->identifier

component->export_function


component->import_function

component->get_version



component->hook_function

component->create_instance

component->delete_instance



CODESYS Runtime Adaptation



CODESYS Runtime

Implementation (based on CODESYS For Raspberry Pi and CODESYS For Linux)

Weak places:

- It is packed and unpacks insecure
- Insecure configuration components by default
- Run as one process
- Compiled without secure options



Protocol investigating

What did we find out?

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Basic description

1. It is not limited to network communication. Also for USB, CAN, serial ports
2. PDU is protocol stack consisting of four different layers: Block driver layer, Datagram layer, Channel layer and Services layer
3. PDU is based on ISO/OSI model
4. PDU sync and async type of protocol

N	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10
00	00	01	17	E8	54	00	00	00	c5	6b
01	40	40	00	43	2d	dc	c0	A8	00	04
02	2d	df	c0	a8	00	27	83	65	01	81
03	04	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00
04	5c	00	00	00	ed	18	d8	dc	55	cd
05	10	00	01	00	02	00	11	00	00	00
06	48	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	22	84
07	80	00	01	00	00	00	23	84	80	00
08	09	dc	39	b8	81	01	b4	00	10	0e
09	41	64	6d	69	6e	69	73	74	72	61
10	74	6f	72	00	11	a0	80	00	b2	57
11	77	66	77	00	24	07	5e	23	32	37
12	7f	75	70	68	40	54	68	75	6b	3f
13	70	68	6a	44	72	2a	7b	55	62	52

Magic PDU of packet (only for TCP)

Receiver and sender length


Total length of packet + 2 header sizes (4b)

		PDU magic										
Message id		Hop info byte										
Service id	N	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	
Packet info	00	00	01	17	E8	54	00	00	00	c5	6b	sender address
receiver address	01	40	40	00	43	2d	dc	c0	A8	00	04	Packet type (BLK)
Channel id	02	2d	df	c0	a8	00	27	83	65	01	81	
Blk id	03	04	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	Flags (master, first)
Remaining data size	04	5c	00	00	00	ed	18	d8	dc	55	cd	Ack id
Protocol header size	05	10	00	01	00	02	00	11	00	00	00	checksum
Service group id	06	48	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	22	84	Protocol id
Protocol data size	07	80	00	01	00	00	00	23	84	80	00	Service id
Data tag 1 with CryptType	08	09	dc	39	b8	81	01	b4	00	10	0e	Session id
Data tag 2 with Challenge	09	41	64	6d	69	6e	69	73	74	72	61	Additional data
Data tag 3 with username	10	74	6f	72	00	11	a0	80	00	b2	57	Parent tag 1
Data tag 4 with encrypted password	11	77	66	77	00	24	07	5e	23	32	37	
	12	7f	75	70	68	40	54	68	75	6b	3f	
	13	70	68	6a	44	72	2a	7b	55	62	52	

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #1. One ISO/OSI is good. Two is better

COIP Fact




TCP Stack Protocols

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #2. More than 10 components process the network packet

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #2. More than 10 components process the network packet



CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #3. Block components add additional fields

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1743, Dst Port: 1743

> CoDeSys V3 Protocol

```
0000 ff ff ff ff ff ff 08 00 27 90 85 bf 08 00 45 00
0010 00 34 00 9e 00 00 80 11 b7 aa c0 a8 00 21 c0 a8
0020 00 ff 06 cf 06 cf 00 20 2f ac c5 74 40 03 00 30
0030 26 6e 03 21 80 00 00 00 00 00 02 c2 00 04 8d f5
0040 00 00
```

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49171, Dst Port: 11740, Seq: 93, Ack

> CoDeSys V3 Protocol

```
0000 08 00 27 a5 f2 66 08 00 27 90 85 bf 08 00 45 00 ..'..f.. '.....E.
0010 00 80 00 cc 40 00 80 06 77 e2 c0 a8 00 21 c0 a8 ...@... w...!..
0020 00 58 c0 13 2d dc 99 0c 36 6a 9d 4a 13 5e 50 18 .X...-... 6j.J.^P.
0030 3f e1 2c fc 00 00 00 01 17 e8 58 00 00 00 c5 6b ?.,..... ..X....k
0040 40 40 00 53 2d dc c0 a8 00 58 2d df c0 a8 00 21 @@.S-... .X-....!
0050 80 00 00 00 00 00 01 81 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 ..$..... m.U.....
0060 00 00 24 00 00 00 db c5 6d 9e 55 cd 10 00 01 00 ..$..... m.U.....
0070 01 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 8c ..$..... m.U.....
0080 80 00 06 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..$..... m.U.....
```

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #4. CODESYS PDU packet contains addresses of sender and receiver


```

> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49171, Dst Port: 11740, Seq: 93, Ack
> CoDeSys V3 Protocol

```

```

0000  08 00 27 a5 f2 66 08 00 27 90 85 bf 08 00 45 00  ..'...f.. '.....E.
0010  00 80 00 cc 40 00 80 06 77 e2 c0 a8 00 21 c0 a8  ....@... w....!..
0020  00 58 c0 13 2d dc 99 0c 36 6a 9d 4a 13 5e 50 18  .X..-... 6j.J.^P.
0030  3f e1 2c fc 00 00 00 01 17 e8 58 00 00 00 c5 6b  ?.,..... .X...k
0040  40 40 00 53 2d dc c0 a8 00 58 2d df c0 a8 00 21  @@.S-... .X-....!
0050  80 00 00 00 00 00 01 81 10 00 01 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0060  00 00 24 00 00 00 db c5 6d 9e 55 cd 10 00 01 00  ..$. .... m.U....
0070  01 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 8c  .....
0080  80 00 06 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....

```

Color								
fields	service_id	message_id	lengths		sender		Receiver	
			receiver_length	sender_length	port	address	port	Address
value	0x40	0x00	0x5	0x3	11740 (2ddc)	192.168.0.88 (c0a80058)	11743 (2ddf)	192.168.0.33 (c0a80021) 800000

- > User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1743, Dst Port: 1740
- > CoDeSys V3 Protocol

```


0000  08 00 27 a5 f2 66 08 00  27 90 85 bf 08 00 45 00  ..'..f.. '.....E.
0010  00 64 15 df 40 00 80 11  62 e0 c0 a8 00 21 c0 a8  .d..@... b....!..
0020  00 58 06 cf 06 cc 00 50  53 60 c5 6b 40 40 00 31  .X.....P S`·k@@·1
0030  00 58 03 21 80 00 00 00  00 00 01 81 24 00 01 00  .X!..... $...
0040  00 00 00 00 00 00 24 00  00 00 13 fd 2b 3a 55 cd  .....$. ....+:U.
0050  10 00 01 00 01 00 00 00  00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0060  00 00 01 8c 80 00 06 10  00 00 05 00 00 00 00 0d  .....
0070  05 03

```

Color	[Blue]		[Purple]		[Pink]		[Light Blue]	[Grey]
fields	lengths		Sender		receiver		padding (optional)	Remaining data
	receiver_length	sender_length	port_index	relative_address	port_index	relative_address		
value	0x1	0x3	0	88 (0x58)	3	33 (0x21) 800000	0x0000	[...]

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #4. CODESYS PDU packet contains addresses of sender and receiver



CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #5. Following components are identified as services

CmpApp – 0x2

CmpAlarmManager – 0x18

CmpAppBP – 0x12

CmpAppForce – 0x13

CmpCodeMeter – 0x1d

CmpCoreDump – 0x1f

CmpDevice – 0x1

CmpFileTransfer – 0x8

CmplecVarAccess – 0x9

CmpIoMgr – 0xb

CmpLog – 0x5

CmpMonitor – 0x1b

CmpOpenSSL – 0x22

CmpSettings – 0x6

CmpTraceMgr – 0xf

CmpTraceMgr – 0xf

CmpUserMgr – 0xc


CmpVisuServer – 0x4

PlcShell – 0x11

SysEthernet – 0x7

CODESYS PDU (Packet data unit) Protocol

Fact #6. Enabled encryption between PLC and IDE encrypts only service layer



Magic PDU of packet (only for TCP)

Receiver and sender length

Total length of packet + 2 header sizes (4b)

	PDU magic											
Message id	Hop info byte											
Service id	N	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	Hop info byte
Packet info	00	00	01	17	E8	54	00	00	00	c5	6b	sender address
receiver address	01	40	40	00	43	2d	dc	c0	A8	00	04	Packet type (BLK)
Channel id	02	2d	df	c0	a8	00	27	83	65	01	81	Flags (master, first)
Blk id	03	04	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	Flags (master, first)
Remaining data size	04	5c	00	00	00	ed	18	d8	dc	55	cd	Ack id
Protocol header size	05	10	00	01	00	02	00	11	00	00	00	checksum
Service group id	06	48	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	22	84	Protocol id
Protocol data size	07	80	00	01	00	00	00	23	84	80	00	Service id
Data tag 1 with CryptType	08	09	dc	39	b8	81	01	b4	00	10	0e	Session id
Data tag 2 with Challenge	09	41	64	6d	69	6e	69	73	74	72	61	Additional data
Data tag 3 with username	10	74	6f	72	00	11	a0	80	00	b2	57	Parent tag 1
Data tag 4 with encrypted password	11	77	66	77	00	24	07	5e	23	32	37	
	12	7f	75	70	68	40	54	68	75	6b	3f	
	13	70	68	6a	44	72	2a	7b	55	62	52	

Magic PDU of packet (only for TCP)

Receiver and sender length

Total length of packet + 2 header sizes (4b)


	PDU magic											
Message id	Hop info byte											
Service id	N	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	Hop info byte
Packet info	00	00	01	17	E8	54	00	00	00	c5	6b	sender address
receiver address	01	40	40	00	43	2d	dc	c0	A8	00	04	Packet type (BLK)
Channel id	02	2d	df	c0	a8	00	27	83	65	01	81	Flags (master, first)
Blk id	03	04	00	02	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	Ack id
Remaining data size	04	5c	00	00	00	ed	18	d8	dc	55	cd	checksum
Protocol header size	05	10	00	01	00	02	00	11	00	00	00	Protocol id
Service group id	06	48	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	22	84	Service id
Protocol data size	07	80	00	01	00	00	00	23	84	80	00	Session id
Data tag 1 with CryptType	08	09	dc	39	b8	81	01	b4	00	10	0e	Additional data
Data tag 2 with Challenge	09	41	64	6d	69	6e	69	73	74	72	61	Parent tag 1
Data tag 3 with username	10	74	6f	72	00	11	a0	80	00	b2	57	
Data tag 4 with encrypted password	11	77	66	77	00	24	07	5e	23	32	37	
	12	7f	75	70	68	40	54	68	75	6b	3f	
	13	70	68	6a	44	72	2a	7b	55	62	52	

Vulnerabilities

Plan: looking for inherited the shortcomings of model ISO/OSI

Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

Classic IP-Spoofing



Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

CODESYS address spoofing. Type #1 - Classic


- > Frame 8: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface
- > Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_90:85:bf (08:00:27:90:85:bf), Dst: Raspberr_92:3a:
- > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.0.39, Dst: 192.168.0.92
- > User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1742, Dst Port: 1740
- > CoDeSys V3 Protocol

0000	b8 27 eb 92 3a ff 08 00	27 90 85 bf 08 00 45 00	..':...:...'.....E..
0010	00 3c 02 03 00 00 80 11	b6 da c0 a8 00 27 c0 a8	..<.....'.....
0020	00 5c 06 ce 06 cc 00 28	01 50 05 72 40 40 00 11	.. \ / - @ @
0030	00 5c 02 27 00 00 c3 00		
0040	37 39 00 40 1f 00 04 00		

Color	Sender		Receiver	
fields	Port index	Address	Port index	Address
value	0 (1740)	0x5c (192.168.0.92)	2 (1742)	0x27 (192.168.0.39)


Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

CODESYS address spoofing. Type #1 - Classic




Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

CODESYS address spoofing. Type #2 – Modified classic



Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

CODESYS address spoofing. Type #3 – With concealed receipt of a response to a request



```

> Frame 1444: 74 bytes on wire (592 bits), 74 bytes captured (592 bits) on interface 0
> Ethernet II, Src: D-LinkIn_ad:fb:c0 (9c:d6:43:ad:fb:c0), Dst: Raspberr_92:3a:ff (b8:27:eb:92:3a:ff)
> Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.0.30, Dst: 192.168.0.92
> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1740, Dst Port: 1740
> CoDeSys V3 Protocol

```

request

```

0000  b8 27 eb 92 3a ff 9c d6 43 ad fb c0 08 00 45 00  .'.:... C.....E.
0010  00 3c f6 09 00 00 80 11 00 00 c0 a8 00 1e c0 a8  .<.....
0020  00 5c 06 cc 06 cc 00 28 82 04 c5 73 40 40 00 11  .\.....( ...s@@.
0030  00 5c 00 ff 00 00 c3 00 01 01 bf 19 68 af 00 00  .\..... ..h...
0040  00 00 00 40 1f 00 04 00 00 00

```


CODESYS Runtime №1
192.168.0.91

192.168.0.92

Color	Sender		Receiver	
fields	Port index	Address	Port index	Address
value	0 (1740)	0x5c (192.168.0.92)	0 (1740)	0xff (192.168.0.255)


Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing

CODESYS address spoofing. Type #3 – With concealed receipt of a response to a request




Vulnerability #1. Address spoofing


CODESYS address spoofing. Type #3 – With concealed receipt of a response to a request




Vulnerability #2. Taking control of an existing channel of communication




Vulnerability #2. Taking control of an existing channel of communication



Vulnerability #3. MiTM



Vulnerability #3. MiTM



Vulnerability #3. MiTM

CODESYS PDU RESPONSE

Sender = 00:212

Receiver = 00:122

Attacker
192.168.100.211
0x00d3

CODESYS
Development
System
192.168.100.212

Ethernet

CODESYS PDU REQUEST

Sender = 00:122

Receiver = 00:212

PLC №1
192.168.100.122
0x00d300007a

PLC №3
192.168.100.124
0x007c

PLC №4
192.168.100.125
0x007d

CAN

Node №12
0x007a000c

Node №31
0x007c0001

Node №34
0x007c0004

Kaspersky In


Node №15
0x007a000f

ference 2019

Serial

USB


Node №36
0x007c0006



Vulnerability #3. MiTM

BROADCAST REQUEST


ADD_SERVICE



Vulnerability #3. MiTM

BROADCAST REQUEST

ADD_SERVICE



Vulnerability #4. Vulnerabilities in password encryption

```
01: Removed at the vendor's request
02: {
03:   Removed at the vendor's request
04:   Removed at the vendor's request
05:   Removed at the vendor's request
06:   Removed at the vendor's request
07:   Removed at the vendor's request
08:   Removed at the vendor's request
09:   {
10:     Removed at the vendor's request
11:     Removed at the vendor's request
12:     Removed at the vendor's request
13:   }
14:   Removed at the vendor's request
15: }
```


> CoDeSys V3 Protocol

0000	00 50 56 ba 2a 30 00 50	56 ba 17 2d 08 00 45 00	·PV·*0·P V··-·E·
0010	00 98 2c 5c 40 00 80 11	00 00 c0 a8 00 da c0 a8	··,\@···
0020	00 d3 06 ce 06 cc 00 84	83 93 c5 73 40 40 00 12	·····s@@··
0030	02 2a 10 d3 02 2a 01 81	20 00 02 00 00 00 01 00	·*·*··
0040	00 00 5c 00 00 00 51 40	52 8d 55 cd 10 00 01 00	··\··Q@ R·U··
0050	02 00 11 00 00 00 48 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 22 84	····H·
0060	80 00 01 00 00 00 23 84	80 00 15 14 4e 11 81 01	····#·
0070	b4 00 10 0e 41 64 6d 69	6e 69 73 74 72 61 74 6f	····Admi nistrato
0080	72 00 11 a0 80 00 ce 01	29 3b 20 5f 36 12 18 42	r·····);_6··B
0090	46 58 f9 75 70 68 4c 54	68 75 77 3f 70 68 76 44	FX·uphLT huw?phvD
00a0	72 2a 87 55 62 52		r*·UbR

11: Removed at the vendor's request
12: Removed at the vendor's request
13: }
14: Removed at the vendor's request
15: }

```

1: encrypted_password =
"\xce\x01\x29\x3b\x20\x5f\x36\x12\x18\x42\x46\x58\xf9\x75\x70
\x68\x4c\x54\x68\x75\x77\x3f\x70\x68\x76\x44\x72\x2a\x87\x55\x
x62\x52"
2: KEY = "zeDR96EfU#27vuph7Thub?phaDr*rUbR"
3: for c, s in enumerate(encrypted_password):
4:     print chr(ord(KEY[c]) ^ ord(encrypted_password[c])),
5:
6:  ? d m i i s t M a t o ?

```

0070	b4 00	10 0e 41 64 6d 69 6e 69 73 74 72 61 74 6f
0080	72 00	11 a0 80 00 ce 01 29 3b 20 5f 36 12 18 42
0090	46 58 f9 75 70 68 4c 54 68 75 77 3f 70 68 76 44	
00a0	72 2a 87 55 62 52	

```

.PV.*0.P V.-.E.
.,\@.
.s@@.
*.
.\.Q@ R.U.
.H.
.#.N.
...Administrato
r...);_6.B
FX.uphLT huw?phvD
r*.UbR

```

```

11: Removed at the vendor's request
12: Removed at the vendor's request
13: }
14: Removed at the vendor's request
15: }

```

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

Header:

```
1: PROGRAM PLC_PRG
2: VAR
3:     magic: DWORD:= 16#DEADBEEF;
4: END_VAR
```

Body:

```
5: magic := magic + 16#BEEF;
```

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

00c0	00 0a 0b 00 00 ea 6c 40	99 e5 08 50 a0 e3 04 50	00c0	00 00 60 4b 00 00 40 5f	00 00 00 00 00 60 a0 01
00d0	85 e0 05 50 d9 e7 0a 00	55 e3 05 00 00 1a 01 40	00d0	c8 00 21 06 03 00 e0 89	01 00 22 bc 80 00 38 00
00e0	a0 e3 0c 40 ca e5 6c 40	99 e5 01 40 84 e2 6c 40	00e0	00 00 00 44 2d e9 0d a0	a0 e1 08 d0 4d e2 10 08
00f0	89 e5 ff ff ff ea 30 42	bd e8 08 d0 8d e2 00 84	00f0	2d e9 00 40 a0 e3 09 40	ca e5 00 40 a0 e3 08 40
0100	bd e8 00 00 00 60 a0 01	c0 00 21 06 03 00 28 15	0100	0a e5 00 40 a0 e3 04 40	4a e5 10 08 bd e8 08 d0
0110	01 00 22 b4 80 00 30 00	00 00 00 44 2d e9 0d a0	0110	8d e2 00 84 bd e8 00 00	00 60 a0 01 c8 00 21 06
0120	a0 e1 30 00 2d e9 18 b0	9f e5 00 40 9b e5 0c 50	0120	03 00 18 8a 01 00 22 bc	80 00 38 00 00 00 00 44
0130	9f e5 05 40 84 e0 00 40	8b e5 30 00 bd e8 00 84	0130	2d e9 0d a0 a0 e1 08 d0	4d e2 10 08 2d e9 00 40
0140	bd e8 ef be 00 00 70 38	00 00 a0 01 f0 08 21 06	0140	a0 e3 09 40 ca e5 00 40	a0 e3 08 40 0a e5 00 40
0150	03 00 58 15 01 00 22 e4	88 00 60 04 00 00 00 44	0150	a0 e3 04 40 4a e5 10 08	bd e8 08 d0 8d e2 00 84
0160	2d e9 0d a0 a0 e1 20 d0	4d e2 71 00 2d e9 00 40	0160	bd e8 00 00 00 60 a0 01	d8 00 21 06 03 00 50 8a
0170	a0 e3 10 40 ca e5 00 40	a0 e3 20 40 0a e5 00 40	0170	01 00 22 cc 80 00 48 00	00 00 00 44 2d e9 0d a0
0180	a0 e3 1c 40 0a e5 00 40	a0 e3 18 40 0a e5 1f 40	0180	a0 e1 08 d0 4d e2 10 08	2d e9 00 40 a0 e3 09 40
0190	a0 e3 14 40 4a e5 1c 40	a0 e3 13 40 4a e5 1f 40	0190	ca e5 00 40 a0 e3 08 40	0a e5 00 40 a0 e3 04 40
01a0	a0 e3 12 40 4a e5 1e 40	a0 e3 11 40 4a e5 1f 40	01a0	4a e5 14 40 9f e5 0c b0	9f e5 00 40 8b e5 10 08
01b0	a0 e3 10 40 4a e5 1e 40	a0 e3 0f 40 4a e5 1f 40	01b0	bd e8 08 d0 8d e2 00 84	bd e8 70 38 00 00 ef be
01c0	a0 e3 0e 40 4a e5 1f 40	a0 e3 0d 40 4a e5 1e 40	01c0	ad de a0 01 d8 00 21 06	03 00 98 8a 01 00 22 cc
01d0	a0 e3 0c 40 4a e5 1f 40	a0 e3 0b 40 4a e5 1e 40	01d0	80 00 48 00 00 00 00 44	2d e9 0d a0 a0 e1 08 d0
01e0	a0 e3 0a 40 4a e5 1f 40	a0 e3 09 40 4a e5 0c 40	01e0	4d e2 10 08 2d e9 00 40	a0 e3 09 40 ca e5 00 40
01f0	9a e5 00 50 94 e5 08 50	0a e5 10 d0 4d e2 08 40	01f0	a0 e3 08 40 0a e5 00 40	a0 e3 04 40 4a e5 00 40
0200	9a e5 00 40 8d e5 a8 43	9f e5 04 40 8d e5 9c b3	0200	a0 e3 0c b0 9f e5 00 40	8b e5 10 08 bd e8 08 d0
0210	9f e5 00 40 9b e5 0d 00	a0 e1 04 a0 2d e5 88 a3	0210	8d e2 00 84 bd e8 7c 38	00 00 00 00 00 60 a0 01
0220	9f e5 04 a0 2d e5		0220	98 05 21 06 03 00	

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

```
01: 00 00 00 60      ANDVS      R0, R0, R0
02: A0 01 D8 00      SBCEQS     R0, R8, R0, LSR#3
03: 21 06 03 00      ANDEQ     R0, R3, R1, LSR#12
04: 50 8A 01 00      ANDEQ     R8, R1, R0, ASR R10
05: 22 CC 80 00      ADDEQ     R12, R0, R2, LSR#24
06: 48 00 00 00      ANDEQ     R0, R0, R8, ASR#32
07: 00 44 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R10, LR}
08: 0D A0 A0 E1      MOV       R10, SP
09: 08 D0 4D E2      SUB       SP, SP, #8
10: 10 08 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R4, R11}
11: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
12: 09 40 CA E5      STRB     R4, [R10, #9]
13: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
14: 08 40 0A E5      STR      R4, [R10, #-8]
15: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
16: 04 40 4A E5      STRB     R4, [R10, #-4]
17: 14 40 9F E5      LDR      R4, =0xDEADBEEF; Write 0xDEADBEEF to R4
18: 0C B0 9F E5      LDR      R11, =0x3870 ; Write addr 0x3870 to R11
19: 00 40 8B E5      STR      R4, [R11] ; Write 0xDEADBEEF to addr 0x3870
                        addr 0x3870
20: 10 08 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R4, R11}
21: 08 D0 8D E2      ADD       SP, SP, #8
22: 00 84 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R10, PC}
```

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

```
01: 00 00 00 60      ANDVS      R0, R0, R0
02: A0 01 D8 00      SBCEQS     R0, R8, R0, LSR#3
03: 21 06 03 00      ANDEQ     R0, R3, R1, LSR#12
04: 50 8A 01 00      ANDEQ     R8, R1, R0, ASR R10
05: 22 CC 80 00      ADDEQ     R12, R0, R2, LSR#24
06: 48 00 00 00      ANDEQ     R0, R0, R8, ASR#32
07: 00 44 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R10}
08: 0D A0 A0 E1      MOV       R10, SP
09: 08 D0 4D E2      SUB       SP, SP, #8
10: 10 08 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R4}
11: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
12: 09 40 CA E5      STRB     R4, [R10]
13: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
14: 08 40 0A E5      STR      R4, [R10]
15: 00 40 A0 E3      MOV       R4, #0
16: 04 40 4A E5      STRB     R4, [R10, #-4]
17: 14 40 9F E5      LDR      R4, =0xDEADBEEF; Write 0xDEADBEEF to R4
18: 0C B0 9F E5      LDR      R11, =0x3870 ; Write addr 0x3870 to R11
19: 00 40 8B E5      STR      R4, [R11] ; Write 0xDEADBEEF to addr 0x3870
                                addr 0x3870
20: 10 08 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R4, R11}
21: 08 D0 8D E2      ADD       SP, SP, #8
22: 00 84 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R10, PC}
```

Header:

1: PROGRAM PLC_PRG

2: VAR

3: magic: DWORD:= 16#DEADBEEF;

4: END_VAR

Address magic is 0x3870

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

```
01: 00 00 00 60      ANDVS      R0, R0, R0
02: A0 01 C0 00      SBCEQ     R0, R0, R0, LSR#3
03: 21 06 03 00      ANDEQ     R0, R3, R1, LSR#12
04: 28 15 01 00      ANDEQ     R1, R1, R8, LSR#10
05: 22 B4 80 00      ADDEQ     R11, R0, R2, LSR#8
06: 30 00 00 00      ANDEQ     R0, R0, R0, LSR R0
07: 00 44 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R10, LR}
08: 0D A0 A0 E1      MOV       R10, SP
09: 30 00 2D E9      STMFD     SP!, {R4, R5}
10: 18 B0 9F E5      LDR       R11, =0x3870 ; Write address 0x3870 to R11
11: 00 40 9B E5      LDR       R4, [R11] ; Write contains of 0x3870 to R4
12: 0C 50 9F E5      LDR       R5, =0xBEEF ; Write 0xBEEF to R5
13: 05 40 84 E0      ADD       R4, R4, R5 ; Add 0xBEEF to value in magic
14: 00 40 8B E5      STR       R4, [R11] ; Write result to magic address
15: 30 00 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R4, R5}
16: 00 84 BD E8      LDMFD     SP!, {R10, PC}
```

Vulnerability #5. Vulnerability of application code

```
01: 00 00 00 60      ANDVS      R0, R0, R0
02: A0 01 C0 00      SBCEQ      R0, R0, R0, LSR#3
03: 21 06 03 00      ANDEQ      R0, R3, R1, LSR#1
04: 28 15 01 00      ANDEQ      R1, R1, R8, LSR#1
05: 22 B4 80 00      ADDEQ      R11, R0, R2, LSR#
06: 30 00 00 00      ANDEQ      R0, R0, R0, LSR R
07: 00 44 2D E9      STMFD      SP!, {R10, LR}
08: 0D A0 A0 E1      MOV        R10, SP
09: 30 00 2D E9      STMFD      SP!, {R4, R5}
10: 18 B0 9F E5      LDR        R11, =0x3870 ; Write address 0x3870 to R11
11: 00 40 9B E5      LDR        R4, [R11] ; Write contains of 0x3870 to R4
12: 0C 50 9F E5      LDR        R5, =0xBEEF ; Write 0xBEEF to R5
13: 05 40 84 E0      ADD        R4, R4, R5 ; Add 0xBEEF to value in magic
14: 00 40 8B E5      STR        R4, [R11] ; Write result to magic address
15: 30 00 BD E8      LDMFD      SP!, {R4, R5}
16: 00 84 BD E8      LDMFD      SP!, {R10, PC}
```

Body:

```
5: magic := magic + 16#BEEF;
```

Address magic is 0x3870

In conclusion

- All discovered vulnerabilities could have been found by the community if the protocol specification had been available
- Security by obscurity approach is not the best strategy for protecting



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Thank you!

```
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ ./opt/codesys/bin/codesyscontrol.bin -vvvvvvv
CODESYS Control V3.5.12.0 for ARM - build Dec 18 2017
type:4102 id:0x00000010 name:CODESYS Control for Raspberry Pi SL
vendor: 3S - Smart Software Solutions GmbH
buildinformation: <none>
```

```
< ... bye >
```

```
      ^ ^
      (-) \
      ( ) \ _____ ) \ \
          | |-----w |
          | |           |
```

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