

Kaspersky Industrial Cybersecurity Conference 2019

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TECHNOLOGY

# Decentralized Anomaly Detection with unused Computing Power in Avionic and Automotive Applications

#### Prof. Dr.- Ing. Andreas Grzemba

## Deggendorf Institute of Technology

- Founded in 1994
- 8 Faculties
- 7000 Students
- 20 % International
- 99 Nationalities
- 142 Professors
- ▶ 500 Staff

DEGGENDORF INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Munich

## **DIT & Cyber Security**

#### Education

- Bachelor Cyber Security
- Extra-occupational Master Cyber Security
- Applied Research
  - Institute ProtectIT
  - Consulting
    - Spin-off ProtectEM GmbH

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Decentralized Anomaly Detection with unused Computing Power in Avionic and Automotive Applications

# Agenda

Architecture

Generic Detection / Reaction System

**Incident Detection Algorithms** 

## Joint Research Project between Universities and Industry



#### lssue :

# Electronic architectures of aircraft and automotive are complex

#### **Automotive Communication Architecture**

Layer 0: Secure External Communication



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#### **Generic Architecture**



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#### **Generic Architecture**



#### **Generic Architecture**



#### Hierarchic Detection / Reaction System





#### **Incident Detection**

Multiple Suitable Algorithms



## **Incident Detection Algorithms**

Many possibilities

Data sets, feature sets, model Supervised, semi-supervised, unsupervised anomaly detection

Rule-based systems

Logistic regression

Neural networks

(One class) support vector machines

#### **Evaluated approaches:**

Variational Autoencoder (Neural network)

Detection of anomalies in respect of the trained data based on classification Issue: theoretical infinite anomlies possible; not resource efficient

Our approach: Outlier Detection with Machine Learning

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#### **Incident Detection**

#### Anomaly Detection with Machine Learning Selection: Isolation Forest and Loda outlier detection algorithms

Properties for anomaly detection in network communication: Operation without knowledge of data labels Possibility of online (real-time) detection Detection of previously unknown, distributed and advanced attacks Detection of point and context anomalies Scalable, flexible and resource-preserving (Training, Classification) in use

#### **Isolation Forest**

Data is separated in smaller subsets

iForest consists of iTrees, that are generated by the subsets

Process of training (modelling)

Nodes of the binary tree have attributes *q* and *p q* is a randomly chosen feature of the data set

*p* is a randomly chosen separation point (between min. and max.)

- $p < q \rightarrow$  left node
- $p > q \rightarrow$  right node

#### Testing the model

Path length provides information about normality / abnormality A anomaly score is calculated for a data set, that runs through all iTrees



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## Loda

Lightweight on-line Detector of Anomalies

Ensemble of k one-dimensional histograms

Each histogram is generated by a random projection vector of the probability density of the input data

Output: Score value, the higher the more likely to be an anomaly

"Benefits" compared to Isolation Forest Online mode without modification Reduced complexity



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## Time Complexity

Time complexity			Space complexity
	Training	Classification	
Isolation Forest	$\mathcal{O}(kl \log l)$	$\mathcal{O}(k \log l)$	$\mathcal{O}(kl)$
Loda (1)	$\mathcal{O}(nkd^{-1/2})$	$\mathcal{O}(k(d^{-1/2}+b))$	$\mathcal{O}(k(d^{-1/2}+b))$
Loda (2)	$\mathcal{O}(nkd^{-1/2})$	$\mathcal{O}(kd^{-1/2})$	$\mathcal{O}(k(d^{-1/2}+b+l))$

#### **Hierarchic Incident Detection**

Issue: model needs many resources
Small resources (CPU, RAM, etc.) on the lower layers
The entire network doesn't need complete knowledge
Solution: Using a hierarchic system architecture
Layer n collects data for modelling (Training) on layer n+1
The trained model is transferred back to n for Classification

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Layer

n+1

n

Output

# Huge amount of alerts ... and now?

#### Handling of Alerts

#### Goal:

Handling of a huge amount of alerts Reduction of False Positives

#### Approaches :

Similarity-based: Reduction of the amount of alerts with aggregation and clustering in respect of analogy, attribute, ...

Sequential-based: recognition of causal correlation, definition of pre- und postconditions

Case-based: using of knowledge-base (training data sets, expert-rules)

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## Handling of Alerts



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the state

## **Demonstrator Set-Up**





## Summary

One IDS/DRC on the upper layer in not sufficient Isolated Forest is more complex as Loda The false-positive rate is for both algorithms similar Very import is the feature set The reaction is very dependent to the application



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## Thank you!

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